

OPAC VIS - INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

Operational Environmental Effects

Time and Weather

- Illumination can not be considered as a key limiting factor for the Coalition or DUSS Forces, as every major asset is all weather Capable. Night fighting capability of DUSS forces is a partial Intel gap
- Exceptions: Army aviation (Helicopters) have only transport capabilities after sunset, no fire support (CAS)

Terrain Effects

Observation and fields of fire

- The AO can be split into two types of forestation, SOUTH or NORTH of N 69°. In the south, dense forests throughout the region with few large openings, rarely spanning greater than an M1 Abrams weapons range. North of 69° there is only scarce forestation with large openings.
- Most openings between treelines are within the range of any given APC/IFV/MBT.
- The general Topography allows little cover for aerial forces, see TOPO Chart. Exception is a hilly highground East of Ivalo, that is distinct in layout from the rest of the ground element operation area. Another notable hill is WEST of Moncehgorsk (Notia) with 3000 ft heights, spanning 30NM North-South. North of Apatity (Notia) is another 20x20 NM mountain EAST of Lake Imandra
- Highest point in Finland: Halti – 1,324 m (4,344 ft)
- Naval Forces, namely Marine/Amphibious forces will have limited options to field a beach landing due to hilly shores (Kirkenes, Banak, Andoya within reach, also into DRK through the White Sea)

Avenues of Approach

- Rapid land movement in the AOR is available only via road, thus Corps size movements can only be conducted on main roadways, described on slide AA. Crossing from Notia into Finland is very limited via roads (less than 10 options) , especially in the North. VIS assessment suggests that a Notian Land Forces invasion into the claimed territory might be conducted via Norway, near Kirkenes via E105, E6 (Norway) towards Finland (Road 92)
- There are about 50 bridges within Notia alone, and about 100 more bridges in Norway/Finland that can be used for large unit maneuvers.
- There is no railway connection between DUSS and the west, only up to the border (from SRN) .
- Naval forces can move unrestricted by natural effects. However, any Notian NAVY surface vessel movements must be flowing through the Kola Bay, where Kola river enters the Barents Sea. This is a single choke point of any naval movement from the Docks, where currently most of the Notian Navy is stationed.
- Aerial movement is unrestricted by Environmental Effects

Key Terrain

- Key cities in Finland (claimed territories) - Ivalo, Kuusamo. Other: Sodankyla (road junction), Rovaniemi, Kittilä, Kemi Tornio (port), Salla (border), Vuojarvi road base.
- Key cities in SRN are Murmansk, Severomorsk, Monchegorsk, Poliarnye Zori (Nuclear Power Plant), etc. see NCAA
- Key cities in Kambiland are Alakurtti, Kandalaksha, Beloe More, Loukhi
- Border crossings into Finland from SRN see slide
- Several key bridges that allow GREATER freedom of movement but there are very few KEY bridges, but even those can be navigated around on an operational level. VIS has identified 148 bridges in AOR that can be a factor of limiting BOTH forces movement, Avenues of Approach, and supply lines. However, there are several bridges in Notia that are key factors for DUSS strategic resource flow.
- 5 SRN Airfields, which serves as a base for the whole Notian Air Force. Disabling any airfield will significantly reduce Air Force mission rates and capabilities. DRK is operating from Single airbase in the AOR.
- 2 Norwegian airfield, Banak, and especially Kirkenes are unprotected from Notian forces (by natural means) Kirkenes is along a main land AA for Notian Army.
- Friendly airbases especially Kirkenes and all six Finnish bases can be considered as major targets for Notian Forces (from their goal to prevent CJTF23 from using those fields)

Obstacles

- Several waterways can limit both forces Avenues of Approach, see slides
- There are no hard stopping bridges in Finland or Norway in the vicinity of claimed territories, all can be navigated around.

- There are several key bridges in Notia that will either totally prevent STRATEGIC road and/or railway traffic, or troop movement.
- Hills or the scarce forests are not a stopping force for the vehicles in the theatre. Notable highground is SOUTH-EAST of Ivalo, into Notia that features steep valleys, and is on a major AA.

Threat Options

Goals

- Capture Claimed Territory in Finland

“Notia have increased their posture toward Finland and had public statements regarding protecting Notian nationals in Notian claimed territory in Northern Finland while also expressing offensive ambitions and need to create strategic depth and move defenses forward.”

CASUS BELLI

Moving Coalition Forces into claimed territory will most probably be considered as hostile act against Notian nationals, and can draw hostile actions

Threat Element	Statement
Command & Control	SRN Forces can maintain control over their forces in a highly hierarchical structure, via Field HQs and command vehicles (e.g. MTLB). Aerial forces are controlled via sector command centers, linked with AWACS. NAVY maintains control via Maritime patrol aircrafts (Tu-142 > submarines) Command abilities within Finland will be limited on disruption/destruction of local Field HQs, highly affected on elimination of Generals who travel in light vehicles. Base HQs have long term tasks, no short term effect.
Movement and Maneuver	Corps are equipped and ready to conduct missions into Finnish territory, not limited by Finland defense forces. Typical transit speed is 20kts on roads. Aerial Forces are fielding long range, supersonic, even supersonic long range (Tu-160) assets supported by hundreds of tactical jets. SRN Navy fields a large Marine/Amphibious Brigade, and separate aviation forces including long range and supersonic. Has one nuclear cruiser and a Carrier.

Protection	IADS is operating within Notia with 6 squadrons of fighters and static SAMs. Corps have separate Air Defense battalions. NAVY fields Coastline Defense Battalions (missiles). Most aerial assets are capable of active jamming
Fires	Ground forces are notably equipped with MLRS, and aviation attack and transport forces but mainly rely on their overwhelming numbers. Have Weapons of Mass Destruction capable SCUD missiles under their command. Operating an IADS fielding ~120 launchers plus ~400 IRSHORAD, and separate interceptor forces. CORPS have separate Air Defense Forces. NAVY is operating 26 surface combat vessels including a carrier, a nuclear missile cruiser and additional 5 diesel submarines. Aerial Forces have ~342 FW assets, possibly field cruise missiles, sea skimming missiles, anti-radiation missiles, and other guided munitions. Most fighters CAN be equipped with active radar homing A2A missiles, typically multirole fighters (no confirmation on fielded ordnance)
Intelligence	Early Warning assets include IADS EW radars, 8x AEW aircraft SRN Forces include an independent Special Operations Brigade and Corps Recon Rgts.
Sustainment	SRN Forces will have to always protect Avenues of Approach to be able to sustain any operations into Finland, as no other sources of supplies are available for them in the claimed territory, including Fuel, Ammunition and will have to rely on their own Logistic efforts. These include FW (IL76, An26) , RW (Mi-8,Mi-26) , ships and Land assets. The NAVY operates 5-5 tanker and cargo ships